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Introduction: Why information is not always used1 
Poorly performing organisations probably do so for a reason. The logic behind many 
initiatives to improve the performance of public organisations has been to enhance the quality 
and availability of information about the performance of these organisations, and the data-use 
skills within these organisations. Knowledge about where performance fails is seen as a key 
factor for getting organisations back on track. By making the organisation and its environment 
more transparent, more known, it is argued, organisations can find new ways to reinvent 
themselves. 
Such an approach is built on a number of assumptions. One is that this information 
unambiguously contributes to the identification of trouble spots and to the solution of these 
problems. Information, in such an approach, is seen as something that reduces uncertainty. 
This assumption is especially strong in the theory of evidence-based management, where it is 
assumed that the ‘current best evidence’ or the ‘best available evidence’ will be used in a 
‘conscientious, explicit and judicious’ way (Stewart, 2002; Nutley & Webb, 2000), and that 
the information will lead to answers. Unfortunately, evidence-based management and policy 
has problems dealing with wicked problems, and often fails to see that more (and better) 
information does not necessarily reduce uncertainty (Learmonth & Harding, 2006). Indeed, 
more information may do little to improve our understanding of social problems (Ditton, 
Farrall, Bannister, & Gilchrist, 2000; Tsoukas, 1997). 
                                                     
1 This chapter finds its origins in two different pieces of work in which one or both authors have been involved. One was a short 
project for the Audit Commission’s Policy, Research & Studies Directorate reviewing the literature on how information is used 
in the public sector, with an aim to support future improvements in the public sector (Van de Walle & Bovaird, 2007). The other 
is an edited book that resulted from a series of meetings of the EGPA Study Group on Performance in the Public Sector. The 
chapters in this book looked at how managers, politicians and citizens actually the mounds of public sector performance 
information that are being produced (van Dooren & Van de Walle, 2008). Research for this article was part funded through 
Steven van de Walle’s ESRC Public Service Programme Fellowship on “Public attitudes towards services of general interest in 
comparative perspective” (RES 153-27-0004). 
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A second assumption is that the mere existence of information will lead to its use by decision 
makers. This assumption reflects an instrumental approach to information as neutral. It 
isolates information from organisational context; from the habits, processes and power 
structures within that organisation; and from the individual characteristics of those who are 
supposed to use the information.  
 
In this chapter, we want to challenge this assumption of a direct relationship between the 
existence and availability of information, and its use in decisions. We will do so by 
integrating three different sets of literature. Other chapters in this book stress organisations’ 
capacities and capabilities to produce a turnaround, or refer to contextual factors that make a 
turnaround difficult. Our basic argument is that the fact that information exists does not mean 
it will also be used by those in charge. A first set of arguments comes from a somewhat more 
recent field of study looking at the actual use of performance information by decision makers 
in the public sector (Van Dooren & Van de Walle, 2008). The second part will focus on 
structural and organisational factors that may facilitate or complicate the diffusion of 
information through an organisation. The third part will briefly introduce psychological 
factors that make that certain pieces of information are excluded from consideration in 
decision making. We will subsequently integrate this information and distil the major trends. 
We end by discussing the implication of our findings on public organisations’ ability to 
connect knowledge to performance. 
 
Beyond traditional views of information 
The story in many government or consulting reports about performance information and 
decision making is a very rationalist one. It treats the non-use of information as something 
that can easily be fixed though a number of practical and technical changes (Van de Walle & 
Bovaird, 2008). Such changes include improving databases, improving the quality of 
information, improving data-processing skills in public organisations, improving information 
literacy etc. (Audit Commission, 2008). What such approaches forget is that changing the way 
How is information used? 
 4
how information is used in organisations basically requires a change of that organisation 
itself. Improving the performance of public organisations is therefore not just something that 
follows from a better use of information. A deficient use of information is often also an 
expression of poor performance.  
Taking into account an organisation’s environment is important when analysing information 
use. Organisations under pressure, in the spotlight of the national media, will probably react 
differently to the release of new, highly publicised information than will organisations that are 
relatively free from such scrutiny. The increased use of league tables may have increased 
political and media attention for failing organisations because failure – as defined by the 
indicators composing the league tables - has become more visible. It has also somewhat 
deflected researchers’ attention to these highly formalised sources of information, leading to a 
neglect of other types of information. Rather than just using formalised performance 
indicators, organisations also collect and use other information. And much information enters 
the organisation undefined ways. 
 
Weiss introduced the concept of ‘knowledge creep’ into our vocabulary (Weiss, 1980) to 
show how our understanding of things and frames of reference change gradually over time 
under the influence of new information. ‘Knowledge creeps’ leave no traces that are concrete 
or directly visible, but do change how people think about issues. Changes in an organisation’s 
strategy or performance then cannot always be easily attributed to a specific set of 
information. Instead, decisions are based ‘on a gradual accumulation and synthesis of 
information’ (Marra, 2000: 23). Information’s impact is not direct and instrumental, but 
conceptual, which blurs the relationship between a specific piece of information and a discrete 
decision. 
Additionally, much of the information collected by an organisation is not directly relevant to 
decision making, but it develops a context of knowledge (March, 1987: 163). This 
information is not needed for an immediate decision, but helps the organisation to stay 
informed on current issues. It is collected for no direct specific purpose or decision, but for 
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routinely scanning one’s environment. This is a process that does clearly not fit into classical 
decision making theory where information is sought to choose between alternatives given a 
set of priorities. Feldman and March spoke about ‘information as surveillance’ (Feldman & 
March, 1981: 176). This means an organisation is monitoring its environment for surprises or 
for reassurance that there are no surprises. This information use has a long lead time, and the 
relevance of the information cannot be estimated in advance (Feldman & March, 1981: 176).  
 
These approaches entirely open up the research agenda on how information is used to 
improve performance in the public sector, by moving it away from technical considerations. 
They expand the agenda by drawing the wider political and social context of the organisation 
and the psychology of the actors within the organisation into the analysis. 
 
The study of use and non-use of performance information 
The use of information is often conceived in a bipolar way; either it is used or not. Use then 
implies that there is a direct 1:1 relation between performance information and managerial or 
policy decisions. This conception is fed by a somewhat technocratic hope that performance 
information will tell univocally how to allocate resources, how to hold organisations and 
managers to account, and which employees to reward for excellent performance. Table 1 lists 
a series of instrumental uses found in ten public management texts that are exemplary for the 
writings of the performance movement2. In total, 44 different uses of performance 
information are identified of which 22 by more than one author (represented in Table 1).  
                                                     
2 Mayston (1985) discussed the role of non-profit performance indicators in the public sector. He was predominantly concerned 
with nationalized industries. Osborne and Gaebler’s (1993) New Public Management text on Reinventing Government prescribes 
several ways of putting performance measures to work (p155). The Government Accounting and Standards Board (GASB 1998) 
reported about a survey of USA local and state governments on the use of performance information. Wang and Berman (2000) 
conducted surveys in USA counties. The USA’s General Accounting Office (2000) surveyed the USA federal agencies.  The 
OECD (2003) has data on the use of performance measurement in the OECD member states. Hatry (1999) proposes ten uses in a 
performance measurement text that is mainly conceived as a manual for practitioners. A similar text by Broom et al (1998) of 
ASPA’s Centre for Accountability and Performance also has a list of uses. Poister (2003) describes the uses of performance 
information. The Governance Performance Project (2002) reviews the management capacity of states and cities in the USA and 
incorporates the use of performance measures in its assessment. 
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1. allocation of resources 
5 
   X X  X X X  
2. changing work processes / more efficiency    X X  X X X  
3. formulation and monitoring of licensed or contracted
privatized services 
4 
X   X   X  X  
4. rewarding staff / monetary incentives / performance pay  X  X   X  X  
5. strategic planning   X X  X    X 
6. communication with the public to build trust 
3 
  X X X      
7. reporting and monitoring    X  X     X 
8. accountability to elected officials    X  X   X  
9. accountability to the public    X  X   X  
10. results based budgeting: budget documents  X X X       
11. results based budgeting: justify budget requests   X X     X  
12. motivation rewards for groups, organizations  X    X   X  
13. evaluation of outcomes and effectiveness X  X  X      
14. reducing duplicative services / delivery alternatives (incl. 
privatization) 
  X  X X     
15. adopting new program approaches / changing strategies   X   X   X  
16. setting program priorities      X X X   
17. communication with the legislature and the legislative staff 
2 
  X  X      
18. cost saving X  X        
19. performance budgeting   X    X     
20. setting individual job expectations/ staff performance plans       X X   
21. cost benefit analysis X   X       
22. trigger for further investigation and action X   X       
Table 1: instrumental uses of performance information (Van Dooren 2006) 
 
Some authors have demonstrated that having the performance instruments does not guarantee 
use. The implementation of performance measurement in the organisation goes beyond the 
mere adoption of performance instruments (Beyer & Trice 1982;de Lancer Julnes & Holzer 
2001; Van Dooren 2005) Notwithstanding the substantial literature on the potential and 
instrumental uses of performance information, there is little evidence on the actual use of 
performance information (Pollitt 2006). Researchers are indeed very sceptical about the 
usefulness of performance indicators and the related management instruments (Askim, 2006). 
Much of the evidence on whether the information coming from performance measurement is 
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used in decision making is still rather anecdotal (de Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001), and 
opinion on whether performance measurement matters for decisions is divided (Ho, 2005: 
18).  
 
Three groups studying and using performance information seem to stand out. First, there are 
believers who assume that the mere provision of good performance information will lead to 
use in decisions. Empirical tests of this assumption are rare. A second group also assumes that 
performance information is used but is critical about the unintended effects of performance 
information. Yet, the occurrence of unintended effects proves that performance information is 
at least used in one way or another. Again, the way in which performance information is used, 
is rarely documented. A third group consists of critics who consider performance 
measurement to be a new bureaucracy. For them, performance information is not used for 
decision making, but is about shuffling paper without an impact on ‘real life’.  
 
All three groups tend to take a black and white approach to information use, often based on 
assumptions rather than empirical fact. We argue that, in order to fully understand the (both 
functional and dysfunctional) effects of performance information, we first need to understand 
the social mechanisms that influence use and non use of performance. In what follows, we 
take a closer look at these social mechanisms. Institutionalisation of information, power 
positions and interests related to performance information, and psychological issues with 
performance information use will be explored as some of the most important dynamics of 
performance information.  
 
Dynamics of performance information 
Institutionalisation of information 
The focus of many public sector reforms has been on the collection of more and better 
information, and on the development of procedures to work with this information. The most 
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visible exponent of these efforts has been the increased reliance on highly formalised 
performance indicators. Performance indicators routinise the use of information in decision 
making, but they may at the same time restrict the scope and type of information used when 
taking decisions. Much of this information may also appear as having a relatively low 
decision-relevance. Organisations may collect mounds of information that are of no direct 
relevance to decisions or policies. At the same time, they may fail to capture information that 
is crucial to their survival. Much information does not enter an organisation in a pre-packaged 
way (Jones, 2003: 406), or ‘precoded in decision-relevant form’ (March & Sévon, 1988: 434). 
It often comes from unexpected or unplanned sources (March & Sévon, 1988). Information 
can consist of highly formalised reports and indicators, but may equally appear as media 
reporting, protest meetings, or stories citizens tell (Herzog & Claunch, 1997). Studying the 
impact of information on decision making becomes especially difficult in the case of latent 
information, or where information gradually enters an organisation. 
 
For performance information to have an impact on decisions, it needs to do more than just 
‘exist’. Information use is a process that is ‘ambiguous, amorphous, incremental, and 
meandering’ (Webber, 1991), and the processing of information does not always happen 
within a clearly defined organisational routine (Moynihan, 2005: 205). Dumping a pile of 
performance reports on a decision-maker’s desk is not likely to have a strong impact on the 
decisions made. Merely having performance information systems does not mean an 
organisation is also managing performance (2008: 134). Information has to be channelled 
through information routines. In this way, information is optimally shared, diffused and 
analysed. Moynihan has stressed the importance of clearly defined organisational routines for 
dealing with information (Moynihan, 2008). Without these routines, actors in an organisation 
cannot make sense of the information. Organisations have to make information meaningful. 
This process of turning information into actionable knowledge explains why the mere 
availability of e.g. low scores on a performance ranking will not necessarily trigger 
managerial decisions. Organisations make sense of their place in performance rankings and 
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develop an explanation for this place. Such explanations may entail the necessary complete 
overhaul of the organisation. They may also consist of a questioning of the ranking system, or 
they may define the outside world as hostile, requiring a closing of the ranks and an exclusion 
of dissenters. This is especially the case when rival sources of information exist. Jas and 
Skelcher give the example of a public organisation where a centralised approach to 
information had been developed by longstanding leaders, thereby constraining ‘a wider 
performance awareness in the organization.’ (Jas & Skelcher, 2005: 205) 
 
Power dynamics: Whose information? 
An important critique levelled against the rational model is that it considers the use and 
presence of information as a given. It leaves very little space for strategic and political 
considerations in making information available and in promoting the use of certain sources of 
information. But, then, there are organisations where the information used is relatively neutral 
and undisputed. This might be the case where the information flows follow an established 
routine, and are of a technical or operational nature. 
  
Information is not neutral, it has to be produced, analysed and diffused. Information may 
support certain positions, or undermine them. Information is therefore related to a power 
structure in the organisation, in two different ways. An information handler’s position in the 
organisation can be enhanced by creating dependency, and through its location very near the 
organisational apex. Information is also related to power structures because new information 
about the performance of organisational departments may have an important impact on future 
budget or staff allocations, or even on the survival of the department within the wider 
organisation. It is therefore in organisational actors’ interest to control the flows of 
information. 
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In the diffusion of information through an organisation, some people act as opinion leaders 
who select, interpret and diffuse information (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1956). They have a more 
prominent role in the diffusion of information than others. Opinion leaders often are early 
adaptors of new information sources, and they are regarded as authoritative people who 
determine which information is useful or can be trusted. They define what information is 
privileged in the decision making process. Yet little is known about whom these people are in 
the local government or public management community, what their status is, and what 
networks they use. Of a different but related nature are gatekeepers. Gate keeping is a term 
coined by Kurt Lewin (1947), and later extensively used in communication studies, especially 
in the context of newspaper journalism. It refers to a process where information is being 
filtered by a ‘gatekeeper’. This person decides which information is relevant or desirable, and 
will get through to other parts of the organisation, or, as in the journalism studies, will get 
published. These gatekeepers exist in all organisations, and they do not always have a formal 
role. Not all information gets through to decision makers: information is condensed and 
summarised, and there are information dead-ends in organisations (Cyert & March, 1963: 
109-110). Gate keeping can also be deliberate strategic behaviour: ‘Information providers will 
try to shape outcomes by choosing what information will be collected and highlighted’ 
(Moynihan, 2006: 156). By not collecting, distributing or interpreting information, or, 
alternatively, by emphasizing certain strategic bits of information, or certain sources of 
information, these information providers have considerable leverage on the information that 
will be used in taking decisions. Control of information is a tool for pursuing one’s own 
interests within an organisation (March, 1988: 6). For this reason, information is subject to 
strategic misrepresentation (Feldman & March, 1981: 175).  
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Psychological dynamics: Do you only see what you want to see and hear what you want to 
hear? 
Information requires interpretation (March, 1988), and the mere availability of information 
does not mean it will be used or even be seen as useful. People’s perception tends to be 
selective. Faced with various bits of information every day, people make a selection of this 
information, and they rely on theories, beliefs, and frames to make sense of this information 
(Tsoukas, 1997). O optical illusions are familiar phenomenon, whereby people see certain 
things that are not there, or see things only after they have been pointed out. Observations are 
often interpreted in line with what is already known. This has important implications for how 
decision makers deal with information. They may not see certain information about the 
performance of their organisation that is obviously there, or they may interpret this 
information in such a way that it supports their views, rather than challenges it.  
 
Managers’ information processing capabilities are distorted by selective perception (Walsh, 
1988). Faced with a wealth of information and data, people perceive and interpret information 
selectively. This means that certain information is not seen as relevant while other 
information is. Interpretation follows schemas (Augoustinos & Walker, 1996), which are 
mental structures used to organise information and simplify reality to aid the processing of 
information. New information is interpreted in line with these schemas. Information that does 
not fit is likely to be discarded. Once managers have formed their opinion on what is going 
wrong in their organisation and what needs to be done about it, they are likely to interpret all 
subsequent information as part of this. In research on performance information use by local 
politicians in Norway, Askim (2008: 134) suggested that ‘[P]oliticians affiliated to parties 
with a highly integrated and structured belief system are typically not in doubt; their ideology 
resolves most decision dilemmas’. In other words, they probably do not feel the need to use 
additional information to make decisions. 
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It will therefore be difficult to convince people to take new and contradictory information into 
account, no matter how available, qualitative, or well-presented it is. Accepting new 
information that does not fit an established view is a challenge and requires effort (Davies, 
Nutley, & Smith, 2000). This is what can make turning around organisational performance so 
difficult. It sometimes requires an outsider to see what is hidden from insiders. Prior 
assumptions and opinions influence whether certain information will be perceived and used 
for interpreting realities. Resisting ‘information that conflicts with one’s prior assumptions 
about how the world works is just part of human nature’ (Jones & Williams, 2007: 267). 
Certain bits of information will therefore only be used in decision making by ’policy makers 
whose policy theories include that information as an important element of their understanding 
of the world’ (Weiss, Gruber, & Carver, 1986: 499). 
 
Once all relevant actors in an organisation have taken their positions, they become unlikely to 
be influenced by new evidence (Weiss, 1979: 429). Decision makers have certain theories of 
whether their organisation performs, and why it does or does not. It requires more than an 
incremental change in the available information to change these theories. Decision makers 
tend to become less receptive to information once a decision is made. Vigilance for other 
information declines, especially if this information would suggest another course of action 
(Janis & Mann, 1977). People tend to seek confirmatory information even when 
disconfirming information is available and more important (Bazerman, 2002: 34). Ideas, even 
when bad, tend to persist, because challenging these ideas also means challenging the 
worldviews and often the position of the person who holds them (Jones & Williams, 2007: 
304). Changing an opinion after having expressed it is often frowned upon, and may be 
undermining someone’s status. Related to this last point is the tendency to lump message and 
messenger together. The credibility of the messenger influences the credibility of the 
message, which again may reinforce the status quo. If a certain type of information is already 
used, it is more likely to be judged as trustworthy (Festinger, 1957) 
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These processes are not the result of a deliberate decision to ignore certain information. Like 
all people, managers have limited information-processing skills (Walsh, 1988). They 
therefore need heuristics, or rules of thumb, to ‘reduce the complex tasks of assessing 
probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1982: 3). And these rules of thumb become especially valuable in cases of uncertainty or 
complexity. At the same time, however, they may, just like the schemas mentioned earlier, 
also facilitate misperception and error. 
 
Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980) suggested that policy makers are performing a truth test and a 
utility test when confronted with new knowledge. The truth test is composed of two 
independent dimensions. Decision makers appraise information in terms of its technical merit, 
but they also test the conformity of the findings with their prior understanding and experience. 
Because they are exposed to a variety of evidence such as direct observation, descriptive 
accounts, program data, routine statistics, colleagues' reports, as well as a body of previous 
research, they use their stock of knowledge to help them judge the truth of research and 
studies (1980: 308). The utility test also encompasses two dimensions. Research is assessed 
on the extent to which a study provides explicit and practical direction on matters decision 
makers can do something about. The first dimension is related to the conventional definition 
of utility, which refers to its ‘problem solving’ capacity. In addition, research can be useful by 
challenging current practices and suggesting new perspectives and orientations. This is the 
‘enlightenment’ function of research (Weiss 1979).  
 
 Truth test Utility test 
Conventional 
wisdom 
Technical: the process of research Problem solving qualities 
Alternative 
explanation  
Practical: Outcome of research vis-
à-vis other evidence 
Enlightenment 
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Table 2: truth and utility tests of new information (Weiss & Bucuvalas 1980) 
 
The distinction between conventional and alternative explanations of the truth and utility test 
allow discussing some of the findings on the use and non use of performance information. Let 
us start with the conventional explanations. The technical truth test implies that performance 
information is not used because it fails to meet certain technical quality standards. The 
argument is that measurement needs to be reliable in a technical and statistical sense for 
decision makers to trust the data. It follows from this technical truth test that use of 
performance information can be increased by improving technical quality. Usually, this 
prospect is not realistic. Between provision and use of performance information, many other 
politico-administrative, sociological and psychological processes are at play. As a result, the 
technical quality of information is only a marginal precondition of use.  
 
The utility test provides another set of conventional explanations. The main line of reasoning 
is that information needs to be able to solve policy makers’ problems. Kingdon’s (1984) 
conceptualisation of the policy process shows that policy making is not just about solving 
problems. According to Kingdon, policy making consists of three streams; issues, solutions 
and political power. The role of the policy entrepreneur is to seek linkages. A window of 
opportunity opens when the three streams meet in a time segment; i.e. when there are 
problems with solutions and the political will to do something about it. If there are only 
problems, only solutions or only political will, nothing will happen and attention will shift to 
the next issue. If we accept Kingdon’s model of the policy process, performance information 
may be a powerful instrument in the hands of the policy entrepreneur. Policy entrepreneurs 
will assess the performance information’s capability to define a problem in line with the 
preset solutions, to better define a solution in line with existing problems, or to mobilize 
political power for problems and/or solutions.  
For performance information to meet the utility test it has to be timely and presented 
adequately. The importance of timeliness follows from the dynamic nature of Kingdon’s 
How is information used? 
 15
model. Performance information needs to be inserted in the public arena when the issue is 
burning. After the fact information will be less useful because the chances are small that the 
same issue will picked up again. Presentation is another important criterion. Performance 
information only defines problems and solutions and only mobilizes support when it is 
accessible for knowledgeable laymen. Usually, a simple statistic is combined with a small 
piece of theory with high face value. The popularity of international rankings for instance is 
largely built on press coverage of simple, ready-made league tables accompanied by causal 
explanations that are easy to understand.  
 
Let us now turn to the alternative explanations of the truth and utility tests. First, the truth test 
of performance information focuses on the findings rather than the technical quality of the 
measurement process. Three scenarios could be distinguished. First, performance information 
that strongly contradicts prior knowledge may be refuted because it is deemed unrealistic. 
Secondly, counterintuitive information may actually be used because it allows challenging the 
status quo. Unexpected findings at least attract attention and may even be instrumental to 
‘rock the boat’ and change power distribution between actors. Thirdly, even a middle 
position, with some counterintuitive and some conventional results may lead to use. This is 
the case when performance information has to support a compromise in policy making or 
when it has to substantiate incremental steps in policy change. The criterion for use thus is its 
(non)-alignment with conventional wisdom, but it depends on the context whether 
performance information needs to align or not. 
 
Finally, the utility of performance information may lie in its capacity to change the language 
of the debate. This is what Weiss calls enlightenment (1979). In more neutral terms, the 
concept points to the fact that performance information may slowly and unnoticeably alter the 
definition of policy problems and solutions. Unlike the other three boxes of the quadrant, 
enlightenment cannot easily be traced back to an individual decision maker. The metaphor of 
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a ‘test’ performed by a user is less applicable here. This is also the reason why the 
enlightenment use of information often cannot be demonstrated. 
 
Information use and interpretation becomes especially problematic where structural and 
psychological factors interact. In such cases, public organisations do not only not have proper 
procedures and working processes to collect, distribute and analyse information, but they are 
also very likely to misperceive and misinterpret information. As a result, organisations 
become almost entirely blind. Irving Janis used the concept of groupthink to refer to ‘a mode 
of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when 
the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise 
alternative courses of action’ (Janis, 1982: 9). The process is potentially very strong in small 
cohesive groups with strong leadership, where nonconformism is not appreciated or is seen as 
a sign of disloyal behaviour. It means that, in a situation with little outside intervention 
(isolation – note the link to the role of gatekeepers), information is interpreted in ways that 
correspond to already held convictions. As a result of groupthink, certain information is 
misinterpreted or not used at all, there is a selective bias in information interpretation, a poor 
search for information, an incomplete survey of alternatives, risks of the preferred choice are 
not examined, and initially rejected information or alternatives are not re-examined (Parsons, 
1995: 347). 
 
Lessons and implications for poor performers: Information can be absent even when it 
is present 
Recent decades have seen an enormous expansion of the use of performance indicators and 
other performance related information in the public sector. The most recent waves in this 
expansion of the evidence base have two principal characteristics. One is an increase in the 
sheer size of the evidence base. Performance information is not new in the public sector, but 
has a history of at least a century (Van Dooren, 2008). What did change throughout this 
century was the use. We have witnessed a gradual adaptation of indicators and performance 
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information in an increasing number of sectors and organisations. The UK is considered to be 
one of the leaders in this area. Performance indicators, some more relevant and useful than 
others, have been developed in practically every area of governance. Nowadays, a manager’s 
task in a local authority or a hospital trust consists of monitoring performance information and 
taking decisions based on this information. In sheer numbers, the information available to 
decision makers is unparalleled. The other major change is an improved integration of the 
information, through management information systems and a proliferation of ranking and 
rating schemes (Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008). The promotion of evidence-based policy has 
likewise stimulated a more systematic use of information, replacing a somewhat more 
haphazard way of dealing with data. Yet, there remain major differences between sectors. 
Using data and evidence is more commonplace in some sector than it is in others. Information 
is also simply more available in some sectors than it is in others. 
 
Given the better availability and the greater ease of finding, collecting and using information, 
there appear to be few reasons not to use information when taking a decision. Not being 
informed appears to have become less and less acceptable. In this context, it has been 
suggested that the absence and the non-use of information lies at the core of why 
organisations perform poorly. Using more and better information, it is suggested, will help to 
improve performance. There are plenty of examples where this has indeed been the case. New 
information does indeed help to put new issues on the agenda. It may indeed help managers 
and stakeholder to identify areas of poor performance, and to suggest new ways for tackling 
issues. 
 
Yet, this line of thinking somehow ignores the evidence presented in earlier sections. The 
mere existence of information does not mean it will be used. Managers may not know the 
information exists in the first place, the information they receive may have been deliberately 
distorted, they may consider certain information as irrelevant, they may not trust certain 
information, etc. Assuming that information an outsider considers as essential and relevant 
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will also be seen as such by people inside an organisation reflects a very one-sided approach 
to information. The problem with performance information, and with information more 
generally, is that it is not as straightforward as we would like to believe.  
 
Facts, generally, do not speak for themselves. Different people interpret facts in different 
ways, and may evaluate the content of facts as being very low. Information is not necessarily 
cumulative, but may be used in an iterative way, each time pushing the decision in another 
direction. More information is therefore not always the solution, because it may prevent 
closure and postpone decisions indefinitely. 
 
Certain information may trigger action, but does not necessarily do so. Certain information 
that has been known for a very long time may suddenly come to be seen as relevant. Certain 
types or sources of information are considered important at a certain time while others are not, 
and these judgements of importance change over time. Certain sources of information can 
enter the policy agenda at a certain moment and subsequently be used, even though the 
information existed before, but was not used. Information can become relevant to a problem 
where it was not relevant before. Certain sources of information may be considered as very 
important and retain this label for a long time, while other sources are rejected at a first 
encounter. Certain information features more prominently in decision makers’ attention frame 
and list of priorities, and new bits and sources of information need to manoeuvre their way 
into the picture. Managers have to select their information from the mounds of information 
available, and this selection is therefore bound to be incomplete (Jones & Baumgartner, 
2005). Information, again, is not neutral. A tiny, short-lived piece of information may have a 
disproportional or even decisive impact on decisions, while large, up-to-date, easy-to-access, 
and well-integrated sets of information may fail to influence decision makers.  
Information therefore does not exist in isolation. It exists within existing organisational 
structures, and just like anything else in the organisation, some information takes a more 
central place in the organisation than other. This privileged information may not necessarily 
How is information used? 
 19
be the information outsiders think the organisation needs. Information needs supporters, 
people who promote, diffuse, and defend it. This information context is crucial to our 
understanding of why information does inform decision makers, or why it fails to inform 
them.  
 
Conclusion 
Many studies on performance measurement have tended to regard performance information as 
unproblematic, and have thus focused on instrumental uses of performance information. They 
assumed that by making more and better information available, organisations would be able to 
improve. Not using certain performance information in this mindset could only be explained 
by bad intent and organisational ossification. In this chapter we wanted to challenge the idea 
that organisations will improve by just providing them with more and better performance 
information.  
Organisations and their employees may be locked into a poor performance mindset. This 
mindset consists of a series of interpretations and beliefs about the organisation, its 
performance and its environment; and causal beliefs about the causes of and solutions for the 
present levels of performance. Such beliefs only offer space for certain information. 
Presenting a poor-performing organisation with new information will probably do little to 
challenge these beliefs.  
Without pressure such as budgetary deficits or a low place in league tables, informational 
biases and organisations’ understanding of their own performance may remain intact for a 
long time. Only new environmental pressures or personnel change may then start to challenge 
such a vicious consensus. Organisations need to overcome organisational and psychological 
thresholds to perceive, interpret and use information – especially information they do not like 
to see. Performance information can be a trigger for change, but the implementation of 
effective performance information systems often requires a great deal of organisational 
change. Functioning performance information systems cannot just be built upon an existing 
malfunctioning organisation. The success of performance information systems depends on the 
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clarity of the processes underlying it. Organisational deadlocks and dead ends will therefore 
probably also lead to information system deadlocks and dead end. 
This makes the study of performance information and how it is used more than a technical 
study of performance information systems. The focus of research should be less on the 
performance information as such, on better performance information, or on the technicalities 
of performance information, but on the people using it and the organisation within which they 
are using it. Poorly performing organisations do not just do so because they don’t know what 
is going on. Often, members of the organisation know very well where, and even why, the 
organisation is performing poorly. In some organisations, organisational SWOT and other 
types of analyses, organisational stories and narratives, and exposure to organisational failures 
repeatedly have made all too well visible what the problems are. The capacity or willingness 
to act on that information, and not the information itself, is then the key to change. Merely 
improving the quality and availability of information will then do little to improve 
organisational performance. 
The value of new external information, such as performance indicators, inspection reports, or 
rankings is therefore not so much in the content of the information, but in the fact that it 
attracts the attention of organisational actors. Established routines and interpretations are 
challenged, and new, or existing, information becomes privileged in the thinking about 
organisational performance. External information, however, may also fail to attract new 
attention or to challenge routines. The credibility of the messenger may be low, competing 
interpretations may be omnipresent, or the information may simply be of low quality and little 
direct use.  
Information audits help organisations to inspect the availability, production, perception, 
interpretation, and channelling of information in the organisation. Such audits map all existing 
information processes in an organisation, identify actors and channels, and compare the 
organisational reality to the desired situation. They help to uncover productive and 
unproductive routines, information processing structures including blockages, and 
duplications, and information use skills within the organisation. 
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Key messages  
• More and better information does not guarantee it will be used; other dynamics of a 
psychological, institutional and political nature (power and interests) are at play. 
• Potential users assess the quality of performance information often in a fundamentally 
different way than providers of performance information  
• For users, quality depends on perceived truth and utility.  
o Truth assessments are based on other sources of evidence such as previous 
experience rather than on technical quality.  
o Utility is mainly determined by the information’s problem solving capacity 
and potential for enlightenment rather than by its technical validity and 
reliability. 
• Information use audits show organisations where, how and whether which 
information is used within the organisation 
• Easily available information is not necessarily the best information 
• Standardised information, for instance in performance indicators, is easy to use, but 
not always what an organisation needs 
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